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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the heterogeneous users decision to participate in co-
management, which is an institutional alternative proposed in the wake of state's
failure in managing the Cochin estuarine fisheries in Kerala, India. Since a collective
action under co-management require not only user's active participation in terms of
their labor but also involve various types of organizational and managerial costs, the
users were given the following choices on co-operation. Firstly, the users had the
choice to contribute their labor in conservation activities, which would ensure
sustainability of the fisheries. Secondly, they could make a voluntary contribution
towards meeting the organizational costs of collective action. Thirdly, they could
contribute in terms of labor as well as in monetary terms. Finally, they had the
choice not to participate at all. Keeping in view the problems of free rider and adoption
of stratagic behaviour by users some incentives were given for each of the above
ways of co-operation. A multinomial logit analysis of the decision of about 369 sample
fishermen to participate in co-management as defined above shows the differential
impact of user heterogeneity in resource management. While heterogeneity in terms
of the present legal status of the users motivate them for contributing their labor even
in the absence of any additional economic incentives, heterogeneity in economic
status and membership in formal organizations matters when it comes to making
monetary payments. In addition to these, the overall optimism of the users' motivates
them to both physically engage in conservation activities as well as make monetary
payments. Adoption of strategic behaviors by at least some users cannot, however,
be ruled out. On the whole it is seen that the heterogeneous fishermen's decision to
participate depend upon their anticipation of the distribution of benefits from co-
operation. However, one must be cautious that those who anticipate disproportionate
benefit from co-operation are likely to take a lead role. Therefore, care must be taken
to prevent them from deciding the rules of the game in such a manner that they are
disproportionately in their favor
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I Introduction
Co-management, which visualizes relative roles for the state as well as
users, is promoted in countries like India during the recent years in their
effort to redress the problems due to state’s failure in managing their natural
resources. This approach while recognizes a crucial role for the state
considers rural communities or user groups as the primary basis for resource
management (Zuffrey, 1986). As far as the role of the users are concerned,
it is argued that they are well informed about the local ecological, technical,
economic and social conditions and as a result are in a better position to
devise well-adapted rules, procedures, and sanction mechanisms that are
capable of gaining broad support among resource users. The role of the
state include providing economic incentives to users to induce them to shift
from a shut-down path to a conservation path of resource exploitation,
clarifying group territorial rights and providing legal framework to rural
organizations to obtain legally enforceable recognition of their identity and
rights, etc., (Baland and Platteau, 1996).
Although conceptually appealing, a successful implementation of co-
management will have to overcome a number obstacles and problems. In
contexts where co-management is introduced as an institutional alternative
to purely state based management of natural resources, the first and foremost
thing is to institutionalize collaboration between the state and the users.
Remember that coordination and information activities are initial aspects of
building institutions (Ostrom, 1992). This means that the state has to take
the resource users into confidence early on the design stages of co-
management for which the co-operation and collective action of resource
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users is inevitable.  In fact, co-operation and collective action is a widely
debated issue both at the theoretical and empirical levels (for instance,
Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 1991; Bardhan, 1993; Baland and Platteau, 1996).
While sociologists and anthropologists look at social norms and codes of
conduct in understanding cooperative behavior, economists usually
emphasize incentives and penalties (Bardhan, 1993). According to some
scholars, collective action have highest chance to occur and be effective
when people belong to organized groups, when they are informed and
consciously perceive that it is in their best interests to act purposively in a
coordinated manner.  Heterogeneity of group, which can be either ethnic,
or even due to the differences in possession or access to some critical
endowments have also, received considerable attention in literature.
Some studies have noted that heterogeneity of group facilitates collective
action because it increases the likelihood that a ‘critical mass’ of highly
motivated contributors will initiate action (Olson, 1965; Oliver and Marwell,
1985). However, there are also studies, which treat inequality synonymous
to heterogeneity and argue that inequality has an ambiguous impact on the
feasibility of the efficient outcome even though better-endowed agents
contribute more to collective action (Baland and Platteau, 1999). Others
like Heckathorn (1992) argue that under certain circumstances, heterogeneity
of interests can impede collective action polarizing a group into opposing
camps rather than coalescing members toward a unified collective action.
In addition to this there is the problem of free rider. We know that in
interdependent situations each individual takes into account the choices of
others when assessing their personal choices (Ostrom, 1991) and if all
participants choose to free ride the collective benefit will not be produced.
There are also studies which have shown that although certain types of
heterogeneities contribute towards the critical mass needed for a collective
action, the distributional implications may still remain as a major problem.
Under such circumstances, even if users initially get to agree to co-operate
and share any rents from conservation, significant prisoner’s dilemma will
soon occur returning the resource to its current situation (Srinivasan, 2005).
The issue becomes even more complex in situations where the failure of
the state in resource management has effectively created a set of users
who are not only heterogeneous but also unorganized and geographically6
scattered. The only common position they have among themselves is that
they are direct users of the resource. So the question is whether these
users can be motivated to co-operate and engage in a collective action
which is a prerequisite for bringing about co-management. In this paper, we
argue that in some cases like that of the Cochin estuarine fisheries in India,
it may still be possible to motivate the unorganized, heterogeneous and
geographically scattered users to co-operate and engage in a collective
action provided some information regarding the likely distribution of benefits
from various forms of cooperation are made clear to the users in the early
stage itself. If this information is not provided, as noted earlier, after an
initial cooperation, significant prisoner’s dilemma is likely to occur thus
returning the resource into its current situation. However, heterogeneity
under these circumstances can have a differential impact and depends
upon the users anticipation of benefits from each form of co-operation.
Area descriptions, methods and techniques
The Cochin estuary, also known as the Cochin backwater, which is about
90 kms in length and 250 kms2 in area is the largest of its kind in the
southwest coast of India. The existence of estuarine passages and bar
mouths makes possible the constant mixing of freshwater with seawater
through tidal exchange giving it the characteristics of a tropical estuary. The
Cochin estuary provides a nursery ground for some species of penaied
prawns (marine) of the southwest coast of India and fishing (although juvenile
fishery1) has been an important source of livelihood for the people living
along the estuary.
The fisheries have been managed by the Department of Fisheries of the
state government as per the Travancore-Cochin Fisheries Act of 19502.
This Act empowers the government for making rules to protect fish and its
habitat and thereby perform the basic resource management functions.
The rules can be classified into ‘access’ and ‘conservation rules’ using the
1 The penaied prawns are migratory species which migrate to the estuary during the post
larvae stage and returns to the sea after attaining full growth.
2 Travancore and Cochin were two princely states ruled by independent Kings before
Indian independence and which continued as princely states until the formation of the
State of Kerala on 1st November 1956. Following the formation of the state, the Act was
extended to cover the whole of the state of Kerala. For the details of Travancore-Cochin
Fisheries Act 1950, refer Ramakumar (1994).7
typology of Baland and Platteau (1996). Access rules are those restricting
free access to fishing in the estuary mainly through the issue of licenses
and the conservation rules are those prohibiting destructive fishing practices,
such as, the adoption of fishing nets with small mesh size, fishing during
high tide, especially, near estuarine bar mouth, etc. For fishing in the estuary
a licence was to be obtained from the Department of fisheries after paying
a nominal amount as licence fee, which varied according to the type of
equipment used for fishing. The important equipments used in estuarine
fishing are the fixed engines such as Chinese and Stake nets, and free
nets of different types and shapes. The traditional fishing community, the
Dheevara mostly operates stake nets.
In spite of having well defined rules and regulations, the recent evidence
shows that the state regulation has been a failure. Ghosh (1987 cited in
Nair 1989) reports that out of 4,823 chinese dip nets operated, 3,131 (65
per cent) are unlicensed. In the case of 12,900 stake nets the unlicensed
are about 3,887 (30 per cent). Substantiating the lack of adherence to both
access and conservation rules, Nair (1989) reports that even though the
operation of fixed engines are prohibited by law during high tide, especially,
near the estuarine bar mouth, it is neither observed by fishermen nor
effectively implemented by the Fisheries Department. Apart from these
industrial pollution is also a major threat to fisheries. There are reports that
around 250 industries on the banks of the river Periyar in the Eloor and
Edayar industrial belt discharge about 260 million litres of untreated water
which contains phosphates, sulphides, amonical nitrogen, fluoride, mercury,
chromium, lead, zinc etc., per day into the Periyar which drains into the
estuary. Under these circumstances the resource users are tempted to
ignore the relationship that exists between estuarine fisheries and their own
harvest practices. A web of interdependent common property, open access
issues, prisoner’s dilemma, adverse selection problem and regulatory failures
have been identified as the causes for the ineffectiveness of state regulation
(Srinivasan, 2005). It is under these circumstances that efforts are taken to
involve resource users in the management of the Cochin estuarine fisheries.
This is based on the assumption that the state have the ability to deal with
the exogenous factors affecting estuarine fisheries and protect the habitat
while users would be in a position to organize, make suitable harvest
decisions to prevent over exploitation, help in the enforcement of rules and8
regulations and bargain for their rights over the estuarine fisheries. Thus
a co-management where there are relative roles for both the state as well
as the users is proposed as an alternative to purely state management of
estuarine fisheries. It has been argued that the control of resources from
within the fishing community as well as from above by the state are two
complementary and mutually reinforcing channels that constitute a viable
system of the administration and management of coastal fisheries (Ruddle,
1987). It should however, be noted that the user communities who are
unorganized and geographically scattered are heterogeneous in terms of
the community to which they belong, legal status, educational levels, type
of equipment used for fishing, awareness regarding the ecological aspects
of estuarine fishery and the various rules and regulations imposed for
fisheries management under the fisheries Act, etc.
It is against this background that the users’ willingness to co-operate and
engage in collective action under co-management of the estuarine fisheries
been examined in this paper. It may be pointed out that a collective action
under co-management on the one hand requires active physical participation
of users and on the other hand has to incur various types of managerial
and organizational costs for bringing users together. Therefore, keeping in
view the problem of free rider and strategic interactions there were several
considerations while seeking co-operation of users.  Whenever one person
cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is
motivated not to contribute to the joint-effort but to free ride on the effort
of others. As observed earlier, if all the participants choose to free ride, the
collective benefit will not be produced (Ostrom, 1991:6). Then there are
strategic interactions which are conditional cooperation that says, ‘if you
cooperate, then I will too’ (Olson, 1965). Gould (1993) argue that in the
absence of incentives strategic interactions arising out of interdependent
decision-making play an important role in motivating individuals to participate
in collective action. Since the fishermen depend on the Cochin estuary as
a source of their livelihood, they are jointly affected by almost everything
they do. In the absence of any coherent user groups, individual fishermen
are likely to adopt a strategic behavior if they are simply asked to co-
operate. Therefore, we tried to provide some incentives to the users for
their co-operation, which is targeted to meet the labor as well as monetary
requirements of a collective action.9
Specifically, the users had the following choices to make. Firstly, the users
can co-operate and engage in collective action by contributing their labor
for various conservation activities. The active physical participation of the
fishermen include their labor towards formulation and implementation of
various rules and regulations for the use and management of estuarine
fisheries, disseminate information on the need to adhere to the rules and
regulations among other fishermen etc. The incentive here is that those
engaging in conservation activities will be included as members of kayal
samrakshana samitis (Association of Backwater Protection) and will be having
a say in decision making without regard to any other considerations related
to fishing. Secondly, instead of contributing labor, the fishermen can
cooperate by making a voluntary contribution towards meeting the
organizational costs of collective action. In order to avoid strategic behavior,
a question whether they are ready to make a contribution of certain amount
of money annually, which would in turn give them a legal entitlement to
fishing was posed to the fishermen. Grant of a licence was considered as
an incentive to prevent the fishermen from adopting strategic behavior
because of the reason that it not only gives legal entitlement to fishing but
also is important in giving awareness regarding various conservation rules
and is also used by the government to identify eligible fishermen for the
purpose of bringing them under various welfare schemes (Srinivasan, 2005).
Thirdly, the fishermen were allowed to contribute in terms of their labor as
well as money for which the incentive in addition to the grant of licence is
the insurance coverage for their fishing equipment and life in the eventuality
of any natural calamity. Lastly, the fishermen had the choice not to participate
at all.
Specification of the multinomial logit model
From the above discussion it is seen that the choices that the fishermen
have are unordered and mutually exclusive. Therefore, a multinomial logit
model specified below has been used to analyze the data.
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Where  j denotes the specific one of the  1 + J possible unordered choices
of fishermen's co-operation,  i Y  is the indicator variable of choices, 
i X denotes
the vector of the independent variables, and 
'
j b  is the corresponding10
coefficient vector. As a standard practice of multinomial logit estimation, the
vector of coefficients for one of the alternatives in the individual's choice set
needs to be normalized to zero (see Greene, 2000) so that the dependent
variable is the loglikelihood ratio of one alternative over the benchmark
alternative. In this paper, the fishermen's decision to abstain from both
physical participation and voluntary payment has been chosen as the
benchmark (reference) category. In short, let  i X  denote the vector of
independent variables, then the estimation function for the fishermen's
decision on co-operation can be formulated as:
j i k j i ik ij X X P P b b b = - = ) ( ) / ln(
'
 if  k= 0.    (2)
where  ij P  denotes the probability of ith fishermen choosing anyone of the
option j and  ik P  denotes the probability of choosing the reference category,
that is, abstaining from both active participation and voluntary payment.
Green (2000) points out that the coefficients in this model are difficult to
interpret. The coefficients represent the effect of a change in each
independent variable on the probability of selecting any of the other
categories relative to the probability of abstaining from both. Since the
coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model represent only the effects
of independent variables on the relative probability of choices, we cannot
compare absolute values of the coefficients across different choices available
to the fishermen. Therefore, in order to properly determine the direct effect
of an independent variable on the probability of choosing an alternative
option we compute the partial derivative of the probability of choosing an
alternative with respect to the explanatory variable of interest, evaluated at
the means of those independent variables (Greene, 2000). We can obtain
the marginal effects by differentiating equation 1 as
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Equation (3) shows that every subvector of b enters every marginal effect,
both through the probabilities and through the weighted average that appears
in dj. These values can be computed from the parameter estimates and the
equation suggests that for any particular  k x ,  k j x P ¶ ¶ /   need not have the same
sign as  jk b  . The marginal effect estimates represent the change in the11
choice probability of each alternative with respect to a change in the
independent variables.
Drawing insights from the literature, the variables such as AGE, EDU, CASTE,
TYPNET, LICENCE, MEMSHIP, RULES, OPTIMISM, LIFECYCL have been
included in the multinomial logit model. These variables represents the
socio-economic characteristics of the fishermen and the variables related to
their fishing in the estuary and reflects various types of heterogeneities.
The explanation of the variables is given below. Care was taken in defining
dummy variables in order to avoid dummy variable trap3.
Table 1. Explanation of the variables included
in the multinomial logit model
Variables Explanation
AGE Age of the fishermen in years (quadratic form)
EDU Education of the fishermen in schooling years
CASTE Caste of the fishermen
1 if Dheevara and 0 Otherwise
TYPNET Type of the fishing net used for fishing;
1 if fixed engines such as Chinese and Stake net; Otherwise 0
LICENCE Legal status of the fishermen based on the possession of a fishing
licence; 1 if possess a fishing licence; otherwise 0
MEMSHIP Membership of the fishermen in their welfare organizations;
1 if they are members; otherwise 0
RULES Fishermen’s awareness of the access and conservation rules
1 if aware of the rules; otherwise 0
OPTIMISM Optimism of the fishermen regarding the likely success of co-
management
1 if optimistic; otherwise 0
LIFECYCL Awareness of the fishermen regarding the lifecycle of the penaeid
prawn, a proxy variable used to assess their knowledge of the
ecological aspects of fishery,
1 if they are aware, 0 otherwise.
3 The general rule is that if a qualitative variable has m categories, one must introduce only
m-1 dummy variables. If this rule is not followed one might fall into a dummy variable trap
which is a situation of perfect mutlicollinearity (Gujarati, 1988).12
The coefficient and marginal effects estimates of the variable AGE is expected
to be negative across all three forms of co-operation. According to theory,
the fishermen’s decision to come forward for a collective action has to be
determined by their net expected gains from doing so. Here it should be
noted that the costs to conserve the resource are incurred in the current
period whereas the benefits only come in a later period. The present value
of the net expected benefits, in turn, depends on the structure of users’
time preference. Those with shorter time horizon disregard longer-term
considerations in resource conservation (Baland and Platteau, 1999). Hence
it is argued that the older fishermen discount the future at a high discount
rate and therefore, are interested in maximizing their current incomes.
However, the estimates of the variable EDUC which measures the number
of schooling years completed is expected to be positive assuming that
formal education can create greater awareness regarding the resource
conservation needs and about one’s own roles in achieving that.
Johnson and Libecap (1982) observe that differential yields that result from
heterogeneity can affect the willingness of the fishermen to organize with
others for specific regulations. Taking a cue from the above argument it was
assumed that heterogeneity of the fishermen in terms of the technology
adopted for fishing, that is whether they operate fixed engines or not can
be a major factor influencing the fishermen’s decision to co-operate.
Therefore, TYPNET that indicates whether fishermen use fixed engines or
not was introduced in the model.  Since fixed engine users are immobile in
nature they are the worst sufferers of the problems faced by the estuary.
Their equipment is also more vulnerable to destruction in the event of any
natural calamity. This also means that they are likely benefit more out of the
resource conservation measures as envisaged in co-management. Due to
this reason the estimates of the coefficient and marginal effects of the
variable is expected to be positive in all the three forms of co-operation.
Another important variable included in the model is LICENCE which reveals
the current legal status of the fishermen. Due to the widespread illegal
fishing in the estuary, the legal fishermen are forced to share the fishing
space and location with other users and are therefore in a disadvantageous
position. Since illegal fishing is the result of the lapses in restricting access
to fishing any measure taken under co-management to restrict entry would13
be beneficial for the legal fishermen. On these grounds the estimates of the
variable is expected to be positive and statistically significant in the first and
last forms of co-operation. Since the grant of a license is the incentive for
making a voluntary payment, the coefficient of this variable is expected to
have a negative sign in this case as those fishermen who already possess
a fishing licence do not perceive any additional benefits for the payments
that they make. For example, Libecap (1989) noted that although the
aggregate gains from reducing common pool problems by defining or
redefining property rights are unlikely to be controversial, the distribution of
wealth and political power that are part of the transition to the proposed
rights structure will be a source of dispute. Since a grant of licence is the
incentive for making voluntary contribution, it is natural that the present
legal users would not be willing to pay. Firstly, they are already paying a
nominal amount as licence fee. Secondly, since redistribution, that is the
sanction of licences for those who are willing to make the voluntary
contribution irrespective of current legal status would affect their status
quo, they would be more inclined to oppose such a move. But when they
perceive some additional benefits the present licenced users are willing to
contribute money as well as labor and therefore, a positive sign for the
coefficient is expected in the last case.
The estuarine fishermen are heterogeneous in terms of the community to
which they belong. It is expected that the traditional fishermen community,
that is, the Dheevaras are likely to show more interest for resource
conservation. Belonging to traditional fishing community means greater
interest for them in resource conservation, which in turn, might influence
their decision for collective action positively. Therefore, the coefficient and
marginal effects of the variable CASTE was expected to be statistically
significant with a positive sign in all three forms of co-operation.
It is said that individuals with common interests would voluntarily act so as
to try to further their interest (Bentley (1949); Truman (1958) cited in Ostrom
(1991)). Assuming that the fishermen in their associations are individuals
with common interest, the coefficient and marginal effects of the variable
MEMSHIP was expected to be positive and statistically significant. Seabright
(1993) in his model of ‘habit forming’ co-operation points out that people’s
expectation about how cooperative others are may fluctuate randomly. If the14
people’s moods are correlated, then any one person’s expectation about
the cooperativeness of others will amount to an expectation about how
likely others are to be sufficiently optimistic about the prospects for
cooperation to be willing to cooperate among themselves. Cooperation is
then induced by ‘optimism about the level of optimism’. Therefore, OPTIMISM,
which reflects the individual resource user’s optimism about other’s co-
operation and the likely success of co-management, was expected to be
positive and statistically significant in all the three forms of co-operation.
Other than the above variables LIFECYCL and RULES were also included
as explanatory variables. This is based on the assumption that when the
resource users are more aware of the specificities of the resource, they
would be in a better position to understand the factors working against its
sustainable use. Penaeid prawns being the major stay of Cochin estuarine
fisheries, the knowledge of the life-cycle of the penaeid prawns have been
taken as a proxy variable to assess the fishermen’s knowledge of the
ecological aspects of estuarine fisheries. Since many of the fishermen are
aware that pollution, fishing during high tide and the use of small mesh nets
act as problems in fishing, it was expected that those who are aware of the
life cycle were more likely to come forward. Similarly, the awareness of the
fishermen regarding the rules and regulations was also assumed to influence
collective action by the fishermen positively.
Data and sample selection
This paper is based on the data collected by conducting a primary survey
among the Cochin estuarine fishermen during January – March 2000. Data
has been collected after classifying the inland fishing villages in the Cochin
estuary on the basis of the dominant type of fixed equipment such as
Chinese and stake nets used for fishing. After dividing the 15 inland fishing
villages into two, a sample size of about 360 was determined using the
formula n=1/a2*Q/P, where p is the proportion of the cases having the
characteristics under study in the population, Q=1-P and a is the per cent
margin (IIPS, 1996). In this study, a was taken as 5 per cent. Further the
villages were randomly selected and the estimated sample size was allocated
between these sample villages. Since the fishermen live in clusters one
active fisherman from each fishermen household of the purposively selected
clusters was surveyed. In the final stage, the surveyed fishermen were
classified on the basis of Chinese, stake and free net users. Out of the 36915
sample fishermen, 55 (14.9 per cent) used Chinese nets, 195 (52.8 per
cent) used stake nets and the rest 119 (32.3 per cent) were free net users.
A structured interview schedule has been used for data collection.
Results and discussion
Before presenting the results of the multinomial logit analysis, a brief over
view of some of the important user characteristics is useful. The average
age of the fishermen surveyed is about 42 years and have about 24 years
of fishing experience. Their educations levels are also fairly high reporting
an average of 7 years of schooling and about 37 per cent of the fishermen
having education levels of high school and above. The average size of the
fishermen household is about 5. Almost 67 per cent (246) of the sample
fishermen belonged to the traditional fishing community. Others are mostly
Latin Christians and Hindus belonging to other backward and scheduled
castes. Almost 60 per cent of the sample fishermen did not possess the
required licence for fishing. Out of 369 fishermen surveyed, only 216 (58.5
per cent) acknowledged their awareness of the lifecycle and 171 (46.3 per
cent) about the rules and regulations.
Among 369 respondents about 57 (15.45 per cent) respondents were willing
to participate in co-management by merely contributing their labor in
conservation activities. About 80 (21.67 per cent) respondents were ready
to participate by making a voluntary contribution only. What is more striking
to observe is that almost 160 (43.36 per cent) respondents were ready to
co-operate by contributing their own labor while at the same time making
a voluntary contribution as well. The rest 72 (19.51 per cent) were not
interested in any of above.
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the
multinomial logit model. As is known, since marginal effects are easier to
interpret and more informative than coefficients, we prefer to discuss marginal
effects concurrently with those of the coefficients.
As per our expectation, the coefficient of the variable AGE is negative and
statistically significant across all the three forms of co-operation. This tempts
one to conclude that being an older fisherman negatively affects the
probability of either co-operating in labor terms alone, or in monetary terms
alone or in terms of both labor and money in relation to the probability of16
abstaining from both. However, the estimates of marginal effects turned out
to be not statistically significant.
Table 2 Estimated Coefficients and Marginal Effects of
the Multinomial Logit Model.
Independent Co-operation Co-operation in terms of Co-operation in terms of
variables in labor terms only monetary payment only labor as well as
in monetary payment
(I)  (II)   (III)
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Effect Effect Effect
AGE -0.0003*** -0.000 -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0004** -0.0000
(0.0021) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
EDU -0.0067 0.0075 0.0254 0.0183** -0.1357** -0.0355*
(0.0774) (0.0081) (0.0702) (0.0094) (0.0657) (0.0118)
TYPNET 0.4533 -0.0612 0.7448** -0.0199 1.4904* 0.2513*
(0.3972) (0.0462) (0.3644) (0.0504) (0.3482) (0.0571)
LICENCE 1.1657** 0.0903 -0.0191 -0.1331** 0.9330** 0.1428**
(0.5294) (0.0599) (0.4749) (0.0575) (0.4292) (0.0748)
MEMSHIP 0.2549 -0.0917 1.2181** 0.0894*** 1.2314* 0.1754*
(0.4592) (0.0641) (0.4693) (0.0548) (0.4238) (0.0729)
OPTIMISM 0.5318 -0.0250 0.4449 -0.0593 1.3859* 0.2396*
(0.5356) (0.0667) (0.4452) (0.0732) (0.4647) (0.0738)
CASTE 0.6652 0.0937** -0.2652 -0.0633 -0.0679 -0.0303
(0.4541) (0.0406) (0.3850) (0.0544) (0.3584) (0.0642)
LIFECYCL 0.27091 0.0188 0.0804 -0.0158 0.2034 0.0237
(0.4089) (0.0423) (0.3677) (0.0503) (0.3415) (0.0611)
RULES -1.0653** -0.1032** -0.3619 0.0066 -0.3290 0.0269
(0.5071) (0.0533) (0.4173) (0.0589) (0.3997) (0.074)
Constant -0.9665 ---- 1.0177 ---- -0.8628 ----
(1.0810) ---- (0.9765) ---- (0.9185) ----
Number of Observations = 369
LR Chi2(27)=97.42; Prob>chi2=0.00
Pseudo R2 = 0.1015Log-likelihood = -431.40975
*, **, *** denotes 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels of significance
Another important result to note is with respect to the variable EDUC. Here
the coefficient shows negative and positive signs respectively in the first
and second forms of co-operation but are not statistically significant. However,17
in the third case of co-operation, that is, both by way of active participation
in terms of labor as well as by making voluntary payment, the coefficient
showed negative sign, which was statistically significant at 5 per cent
significance level. When we look at the estimates of marginal effects, it can
be seen that the estimates are statistically significant in the second and
third cases with positive and negative estimates respectively. Apparently
what makes them behave positively in the second case is the presence of
a licence as an incentive. The negative and statistically significant estimates
of the coefficient and marginal effect in the third form of co-operation could
be due to the adoption of strategic behavior which may be due to their
apprehensions about the practicability of giving the incentives in the third
case as compared to the second one.
When we consider the sign of the coefficient of TYPNET it is seen that in
all the three cases, it is positive and is statistically significant in the last two
cases. Since they are immobile with respect to fishing location, they suffer
more from both endogenous and exogenous problems faced by the estuary.
Even though being a fixed engine user is not a condition sufficient enough
to motivate them to co-operate in terms of contributing their labor, as is
evident from the table, it certainly is a determinant in the other two cases.
While being a fixed engine user positively affects the probability of making
a monetary payment, as is seen from the marginal effects, that alone does
not significantly influence the fishermen to choose the second form of co-
operation. However, the estimates of both coefficient and marginal effects
are statistically significant at higher levels of significance in the last form of
co-operation indicating the significance of the variable in explaining
cooperation in terms of labor as well as money. This is not surprising as the
fixed engine users are the ones who will benefit more from the incentives
that accompany the last form of co-operation.
As per our expectation the coefficient of the variable LICENCE is positive
and statistically significant in the first and last forms of co-operation.
Regarding the second form of co-operation, that is, making only voluntary
payment, unlike the coefficient which had a negative sign that was not
statistically significant, the marginal effects had a statistically significant
negative sign. It is interesting to observe that both the coefficient as well as
marginal effect estimates was positive and statistically significant in explaining
the last form of co-operation.18
There are also some other factors that exercise considerable influence on
the users decision to co-operate. For example, MEMSHIP that indeed was
not an important variable explaining the first form of co-operation as is
evident from both coefficient and marginal effects estimates turns out to be
a major determinant in the other two forms. This is clear from both
coefficients and marginal effects estimates, which are statistically significant.
Although it is true that when fishermen are members of an identifiable
collective identity they are bound by a norm of fairness at least with respect
to specific collective good in question, that alone cannot be taken as a
major determinant. The first case clearly reflects the attitude of the fishermen
who do not perceive any additional benefits out of conservation measures.
In the other two cases, which also accompany some additional incentives,
one finds that the fishermen are interested in co-operating in collective
action. This implies that in the absence of coherent user groups, users
belonging to any organization which are not necessarily user groups but in
one way or the other related to their livelihood activity can be motivated to
co-operate in resource management activities provided that they derive
some economic reward for their co-operation.
RULES is yet another variable which has to be paid proper attention. Here
both marginal effects and coefficient estimates have negative signs which
are statistically significant in the first case which could be a reflection of
their strategic behaviors. As some of the respondent fishermen themselves
could be rule violators, in an event of strict resource use regulation they
are likely to suffer. The estimates of both coefficient and marginal estimates
were not significant in the other two cases.
Another important variable to be noted is OPTIMISM. While optimism is not
so important in engaging only in active labor participation or only making
voluntary payment, the variable is very important in the third form of co-
operation where the coefficient of the variable is positive and statistically
significant. This means that if the individual users are sufficiently optimistic
about the likely success of co-management then they are ready to invest
both money and time for the conservation activities. This is an important
result to observe since co-operation and collective action is not a question
of either labor participation or merely monetary contribution from the
individual users but requires their full commitment in terms of both.19
Lastly, CASTE and LIFECYCL variables were not statistically significant in
explaining the co-operation of the fishermen. This is against the widely held
argument that people belonging to the traditional communities and those
who are aware of the ecological specificities are more likely to come forward
for resource conservation activities. In other words, the results indicate that
these conditions are not enough for the users to engage in resource
conservation activities in the present context.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents an analysis of the fishermen’s decision to co-operate
and engage in collective action in co-management, which is proposed as an
alternative to the failure of the state in managing the Cochin estuarine
fisheries in India. The estuarine fisheries have been managed by the State
according to the Travancore-Cochin fisheries Act of 1950. However, the
recent evidence point to the fact that state management have been a
failure and the fisheries have been adversely affected by both exogenous
as well as endogenous factors. It is under these circumstances that co-
management where there are relative roles both for the users as well as the
state have been proposed. However, it should be noted that the estuarine
fishermen are not only heterogeneous but also are unorganized and
geographically scattered.
Since co-management involves co-operation not only in terms of labor
contribution but also in terms of monetary contribution for meeting various
organizational and managerial costs, the co-operation of the fishermen
have been addressed in the following manner in this study. The fishermen
had different choices for co-operation with different incentives associated
with them keeping in view the problems of free rider and adoption of strategic
behavior. Firstly, they could participate in conservation activities in terms of
their own labor. This will give them membership in Kayal samrakshana
samitis and a say in decision making irrespective of their status related to
fishing. Secondly, they could make a voluntary contribution in terms of
money towards meeting the organizational costs of collective action for
which the incentive was the grant of a fishing licence. Thirdly, they could
engage in physical participation as well as make a voluntary payment for
which besides the grant of a fishing licence, insurance coverage for the
fishing equipment and life was the additional incentive. Finally, they could20
abstain from both. It was found that out of 369 sample fishermen, 57 (15.45
per cent) were willing to participate in terms of their labor only and another
80 (21.67 per cent) were willing to make a voluntary contribution in terms
of money. Another 160 (43.36 per cent) were willing to participate in terms
of labor as well as in monetary terms. The rest 72 (19.51 per cent) were
not interested in any of above. A multinomial logit model has been used to
analyze the data.
The estimates of the coefficient and marginal effects of the multinomial
model offer interesting results and are by and large consistent with few
exceptions. Although the sign and significance of the coefficient of the
variable AGE was according to our expectation that being an older fishermen
negatively affects the probability of co-operation, that alone is not enough
for us to conclude that they are less likely to co-operate as is seen from
the marginal estimates. Strategic behavior by educated fishermen which
could be due to their apprehensions about the practicability of giving
incentives in third form of co-operation as compared to second one have
been observed. The variable TYPNET, which in fact is a reflection of the
economic heterogeneity of the fishermen, also have interesting results to
offer. Unlike in the first case where TYPNET is not all that important, it
certainly is important in the other two cases. This is not surprising as the
fixed engine users are the ones who will benefit more from the incentives
that accompany the second and third forms of co-operation.  Similarly, the
variable LICENCE, which indicates the heterogeneity in terms of the current
legal status of the users, also offers interesting results. In conformity with
our expectation, the coefficient of the variable is positive and statistically
significant in the first and last forms of co-operation. Regarding making only
voluntary payment, unlike the coefficient which had a negative sign that was
not statistically significant, the marginal effects had a statistically significant
negative sign. This is understandable, as the current legal users do not
anticipate any additional benefits from contributing money, as grant of a
fishing licence is the incentive given for monetary contribution. When it
comes to the question of making contribution in terms of labor as well as
money, the coefficient as well as marginal effect estimates was positive and
statistically significant. Other variables that were found to be important in
explaining co-operation are MEMSHIP, OPTIMISM etc, especially when it
comes to the last form of co-operation. However, here also one can observe21
the difference in the behavior of the fishermen who perceive some additional
benefits or economic incentives from co-operation. It is significant to note
that if the individual users are sufficiently optimistic about the likely success
of co-management then they are ready to invest both money and time for
the conservation activities. RULES, although is not significant in explaining
second and third forms of co-operation is important in the first case. This
could be due to some strategic behavior, as at least some of the respondent
fishermen themselves could be rule violators and therefore, if strict resource
use regulations are implemented they are likely to suffer. Lastly, as against
the widely held argument that people belonging to the traditional communities
and those who are aware of the ecological specificities are more likely to
come forward for resource conservation activities, CASTE and LIFECYCL
variables were not statistically significant in explaining the co-operation of
the fishermen.
To sum up, while heterogeneity in terms of legal status positively affects the
decision to co-operate in labor terms, when it comes to the more pertinent
question of making monetary payment, economic heterogeneity and
membership in formal organizations matters and the decision depends on
the anticipated benefits from conservation. Apart from these, optimism about
other users co-operation and success of an institutional change are found
to be very important. However, even in this case where some information
about the likely distribution of benefits is provided to the users, one cannot
rule out the adoption of strategic behaviors at least by some users. Therefore,
it is important to note and recognize that for a given a set of users’, similar
kinds of heterogeneities can have strikingly differential impacts on various
forms of co-operation. In situations like that of the Cochin estuarine fisheries,
where heterogeneity of unorganized users is a matter of fact, it would be
better to design policies that seek users involvement in resource management
in such a way that users are given more than a single choice on co-
operation. In other words, if at all co-management has to be introduced in
such situations, instead of debating whether heterogeneity is good or bad
for co-management, policies should be designed to make best use of the
heterogeneous users interest in resource management. However, one must
be cautious that those who anticipate disproportionate benefit from collective
action are likely to take a lead role. Therefore, care should be taken to
prevent them from deciding the rules of the game in such a manner that
they are disproportionately in their favor.22
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